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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the district court correctly hold that there was no evidence to show that Woodside
had any knowledge of collapsible soils below the Appellants' house at a depth greater than
2Vi feet at the time the Appellants' house was built?

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Ali Yazd and Parvin Yousefi ("Appellants") filed a lawsuit against Woodside

accusing Woodside of engaging in fraudulent conduct by intentionally concealing or failing
to disclose to Appellants information that allegedly reveals the existence of collapsible soils
at a depth greater than 2Vi feet beneath the house Woodside constructed for Appellants. To
support their claims, Appellants are required to show by clear and convincing evidence that
Woodside knew about the existence of collapsible soils at a depth greater than IVi feet, which
knowledge Woodside allegedly gainedfroma soils report for an adjoining piece of property,
and that the information Woodside failed to disclose was material. Appellants are unable to
produce evidence to support their claims because the information Woodside allegedly failed
to disclose shows that Woodside removed all the collapsible soil of which it was aware from
beneath Appellants' house. Because Appellants cannot meet their burden, their claims for
fraudulent concealment and fraudulent non-disclosure were properly dismissed.
B.

Course of Proceedings,
Appellants filed their complaint on April 27, 2002 asserting claims for relief for

fraudulent concealment, fraudulent non-disclosure, breach of warranty, mutual mistake and
unilateral mistake. (R. at 000-011.) In response, Woodside filed a motion to dismiss and
compel arbitration. (R. at 15-17.) Judge Schofield granted the motion in part, ordering that
Appellants' contract claims were subject to arbitration. (R. at 106-109.) On August 25,
2003, Woodside filed a motion for summary judgment based on Appellants' failure to
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provide clear and convincing evidence that Woodside was aware of collapsible soils beneath
Appellants' home at a depth greater than 2Vi feet. (R. at 393-537.) In an order dated
November 19,2003, Judge Stott granted Woodside's motion for summary judgment. (R. at
904-906.) Appellants filed their notice of appeal from that order on November 25,2003. (R.
at 907-908.)
C.

Response to Appellants' Material Facts,
Appellants provide this Court with thirty-one purportedly material facts to support

their appeal. Most of these facts do not go to the issue before this Court as to whether
Woodside had any knowledge of collapsible soils at a depth greater than IVi feet below
Appellants' house and are therefore immaterial. Additionally, some of Appellants' material
facts are not supported by the record below.
1.

Undisputed.

2.

Undisputed.

3.

Undisputed that Appellants noticed cracks in their house and notified

Woodside of those cracks sometime in 1996. Affirmatively state that Woodside's
determination that the cracking was normal was the result of taking measurements in the
house.
4.

Dispute that Woodside was aware ofproblems with a "number" of neighboring

houses within thirty days of October 24,1995. The record cite provided by Appellants does
not support this conclusion. Nowhere on pages 25 and 27 of Kenneth Karren's deposition

3

does he provide a date of when Woodside had notice of problems with other houses in
Appellants' neighborhood. Nevertheless, this fact is not material.
5.

Woodside does not dispute that the Seawrights, whose house was located

several lots away from Appellants' house and at the bottom of a swell, complained about
cracking in their home in April 1995. Nevertheless, this fact is not material.
6.

Undisputed. Nevertheless, this fact is not material.

7-

Woodside does not dispute that the Appellants put their home for sale or that

they procured a buyer. The record cite provided by Appellants, however, does not support
their statement that Karren told the new buyers about potential collapsible soils.
Nevertheless, this fact is not material.
8.

Undisputed.

9.

Woodside does not dispute that Karren's report contained the statement alleged

by Appellants. Nevertheless, this fact is not material.
10.

Woodside does not dispute that this is Karren's testimony. Nevertheless, this

fact is not material.
11.

Woodside does not dispute that Hartley tested the soils near the southwest

corner of Appellants' house. Neither Hartley nor Karren concluded, however, that
collapsible soils existed under the house as the testing occurred near the house. (R. at 663
("I recommended that a soil boring be conducted near the southwest comer of the house."
(emphasis added)).) Nevertheless, the results of a soils analysis that was conducted more
than six years after the house was built is not material.
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12.

Undisputed.

13.

Undisputed.

14.

Woodside does not dispute that it had a soils study done on all of the Panorama

Point subdivision except for the parcel of land that it purchased from the LDS Church
("Church Site"). That study was completed in 1991, however, not 1995. (R. at 513.) This
study was completed prior to the time Woodside purchased the Church Site. (See Exhibit
C to the Brief of Appellants.)
15.

Woodside does not dispute that the soils report prepared by Sergent, Hauskins

& Beckwith1 ("SHB Report") disclosed the existence of collapsible soils to a depth of 2Vi
feet in the Panorama Point Subdivision.
16.

Undisputed. Woodside did not reveal the SHB Report to Appellants because

more than 2/4 feet of soil was removed during the construction of Appellants' house.
17.

Woodside does not dispute Paragraph 17 to the extent it is intended to discuss

the interior walls of Appellants' house. As to the exterior perimeter footings, Gordon stated,
"No remedial action is recommended for exterior perimeter footings." (R. at 631.)
18.

Undisputed, except Woodside points out that the Appellants' lot and the

Church Site are adjacent to the extent that one comer of Appellants' lot touches one corner
of the Church Site. (See Exhibit B to the Brief of Appellants.)
19.

Undisputed.

Sergent, Hauskins & Beckwith became Agra Earth & Environmental, which then became Amec
Earth & Environmental. (R. at 518.) The entity formerly known as Sergent, Hauskins & Beckwith and Agra
Earth & Environmental is hereinafter referred to as "Amec."
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20.

Undisputed.

21.

Undisputed.

22.

Undisputed.

23.

Disputed. Livingston provided an affidavit clarifying his deposition testimony.

(R. at 406-407.) Livingston stated that although he arranged for the report prepared by Delta
Geotechnical Consultants, Inc.("Delta Report") to be mailed to Woodside, he does not have
personal knowledge as to whether Woodside ever actually received the Delta Report. (Id.)
24.

Undisputed, but not material as the Appellants' house was not built on the

Church Site.
25.

Undisputed, but not material as the Appellants' house was not built on the

Church Site.
26.

Woodside does not dispute that test hole #6 included in the Delta Report was

near Appellants' property. That particular test hole revealed the existence of collapsible soils
to a depth of 5 feet. (R. at 429.)
27.

Disputed. The record cite by Appellants does not support this purported fact.

Karren did not testify that Woodside was aware of whether fill material was present on
Appellants' lot, nor did Karren testify that he was aware of whether fill material was present
on Appellants' lot. (The record cite provided by Appellants references a paragraph from
their summary judgment opposition memorandum that relies on page 28 of Karren's
Deposition, and page 28 of Karren's Deposition is not included in the Record.)
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28.

Woodside does not dispute that it did not disclose the existence of potentially

collapsible soils on the Church Site to Appellants because Appellants' lot was not located on
the Church Site.
29.

Woodside does not dispute that it did not disclose the existence of the Delta

Report on the Church Site to Appellants because Appellants' lot was not located on the
Church Site.
30.

Woodside does not dispute that it did not disclose the existence of the SHB

Report, the Delta Report or any other report to Appellants. Woodside requested and received
a site specific field report from Bill Gordon of Amec, wherein Gordon inspected the mass
excavation for Appellants' house and concluded that the underlying soils would support
Appellants' house ("Field Report"). Woodside had no duty to disclose the SHB Report,
Delta Report or any other report to Appellants because, to Woodside's knowledge, all
collapsible soils had been removed from beneath Plaintiffs' house during the mass
excavation. (R. at 403-404.)
31.

Woodside does not dispute that it did not disclose the existence of the SHB

Report, the Delta Report or any other report to Appellants. Woodside requested and received
a site specific field report from Bill Gordon of Amec, wherein Gordon inspected the mass
excavation for Appellants' house and concluded that the underlying soils would support
Appellants' house. Woodside had no duty to disclose the SHB Report, Delta Report or any
other report to Appellants because, to Woodside's knowledge all collapsible soils had been
removedfrombeneath Plaintiffs' house during the mass excavation. (R. at 403-404.)
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D.

Woodside's Material Facts.
Woodside's statement of material facts is taken from Woodside's Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 533-536.) Appellants did not dispute facts
1 through 10 set forth below, in the district court (R. at 720-722). In addition, Appellants
failed to comply with Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(b) in their effort to
dispute Woodside's facts 11 through 17, set forth below, in the district court (R. at 764-768)
because they failed to "specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which [they]
relie[d]" in attempting to raise an issue of fact. Utah Rule of Judicial Admin. 4-501(2)(b).
Because of Appellants' failed to dispute the facts underlying Woodside's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the following facts must be deemed admitted for purposes of this
appeal. See id.
1.

Woodside owned land that became the Panorama Point subdivision

("Subdivision") located in Lindon, Utah. (R. at 521-524, 720.)
2.

In preparation for the construction of the Subdivision, Woodside requested that

Amec conduct an investigation of the soils in the Subdivision and provide a report (the SHB
Report) (R. at 471-514) of that investigation to Woodside. (R. at 517, 521-524, 721.)
3•

Amec drilled eight test pits throughout the Subdivision ranging in depth from

10.0 to 12.0 feet from which they evaluated the condition of the soil. (R. at 512,721.)
4.

The SHB Report disclosed that "[t]he most significant geotechnical aspect of

the site is the upper one and one-half to two and one-half feet of soil which are moisture-
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sensitive, collapsible" and recommended the removal or compaction of the collapsible soils.
(R. at 507, 721.)
5.

On or about March 11, 1995, Appellants entered into a Purchase Agreement

("Agreement") with Woodside for the construction of a house on lot 304 of the Subdivision.
(R. at 535, 721.)
6.

The property upon which Lot 304 is located was covered by the SHB Report.

(R. at 471, 721.)
7.

On or about April 8, 1992, Delta Geotechnical Consultants Inc. ("Delta")

prepared a geotechnical study for the LDS Church for the Church Site where the LDS Church
was contemplating the construction of a stake center, which is a large meetinghouse. (R. at
409-454,721.)
8.

The Delta Report disclosed the presence of "6 to 16 feet of loose sandy silt

underlain by loose to medium dense silty sand." (R. at 449, 721.)
9.

The Delta Report did not include an analysis of the soil for Lot 304, the lot

purchased by Appellants. (R. at 450, 721.)
10.

Woodside subsequently purchased the Church Site from the Corporation of the

Presiding Bishop of the LDS Church ("CPB"). (R. at 523, 721.)
11.

Blaine Livingston, the CPB representative, did not personally deliver a copy

of the Delta Report to anyone at Woodside. Instead, Livingston followed his standard
practice of preparing a copy of the Delta Report and instructing an assistant to mail a copy
of the Delta Report to Woodside. The copy of the report he sent to Woodside was not sent
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by registered mail or certified mail. Livingston does not know if the Delta Report was
actually received by Woodside. (R. at 406-407.)
12.

Woodside did not see a copy of the Delta Report until some time in 1997. (R.

at 646.)
13.

Woodside discussed the Church Site with William Gordon, an engineer at

Amec, and believed that the soil conditions at the Church Site were the same as the soil
conditions disclosed in the SHB Report. Woodside also understood that the project that the
LDS Church was considering involved a large single structure that was different from the
single family homes that Woodside was planning to build. (R. at 534.)
14.

During the construction of Appellants' house, more than two and one half feet

of soil were removed from Lot 304. (R. at 403-04 ("[t]he mass excavation has been
completed and extends anywhere from six to eight feet below original grade . . . . " ) ; R. at
400.)
15.

William Gordon visited Lot 304 while Appellants' house was being

constructed to inspect the mass excavation. Gordon determined that the underlying soils
would support the house and made certain recommendations concerning the placement and
compaction of structural fill. (R. at 403-04.)
16.

Woodside understood that the mass excavation of Lot 304 had removed all

collapsible soils from Lot 304. (R. at 400.)
17.

Woodside followed the recommendations made by Gordon in the Field Report

before laying the foundation for Appellants' house. (R. at 400.)
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
"On an appeal of a district court's entry of summary judgment, [the appellate court]
appl[ies] the same standard as applied by the district court. Citv Consumer Servs. v. Peters.
815 P.2d 234, 239 (Utah 1991); Durham v. Margetts. 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).
According to that standard, summaryjudgment is only appropriate where 'there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact a n d . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.' UtahR. Civ. P. 56(c).'"When reviewing a court's decision to grant summaryjudgment,
[the appellate court] examine[s] the court's legal conclusions for correctness.'" Young v. Salt
Lake Citv Sch.Dist. 2002 UT 64, ^10,52 P.3d 1230 (quoting Tustian v. Schriever. 2001 UT
84, H13,34 P.3d 755)." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. Inc.. 2003 UT 23, H 13.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court properly granted summary judgment to Woodside because the
undisputed facts show that Woodside did not have knowledge of collapsible soils at a depth
greater than IVi feet on Appellants' lot. In granting summary judgment, the district court did
not improperly find facts or weigh evidence. Instead, Appellants' failure to produce clear
and convincing evidence that Woodside had engaged in fraudulent conduct warranted
summary judgment in favor of Woodside.
ARGUMENT
Appellants claim that the district court erred by concluding that there were no issues
of fact concerning Woodside's knowledge of the Delta Report and other soil conditions on
the Church Site. This position illustrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the district
11

court's ruling. In fact, for purposes of Woodside's summary judgment motion, Woodside
stated at oral argument that the court could assume that Woodside had the Delta Report, was
knowledgeable about its contents and understood the soil conditions on the Church Site. For
purposes of this appeal, the Court can likewise assume those same facts. Facts concerning
the Delta Report and the soil conditions on the Church Site, however, do not alter the
knowledge Woodside had concerning Appellants' lot. Such facts are also immaterial to the
soil conditions on Appellants' lot given the report Woodside received from a soils engineer
that specifically addressed the soil conditions underlying Appellants' house.

L

APPELLANTS FAILED TO PROVIDE CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS OF FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT AND FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE,2
In order "[t]o support [their] claim of fraudulent nondisclosure [Appellants] must

prove the following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal
duty to communicate." Mitchell v. Christensen, 31 P.3d 572, 574 (Utah 2001). Similarly,
"[fraudulent concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate
certain facts remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him."
McDougal v. Weed. 945 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah App.1997). Therefore, both fraudulent

2

Appellants contend that it is almost always inappropriate to grant summary judgment on a fraudulent
concealment claim based on Jensen v. IHC Hosps.. Inc.. 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). One element is common
to both Appellants' fraudulent concealment claim and fraudulent non-disclosure claim: knowledge of the
material information that is concealed or not disclosed. Summary judgment is appropriate in this case
because Appellants failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that Woodside had knowledge that it
concealed or failed to disclose. To the extent that Jensen limits the grant of summary judgment in fraudulent
concealment cases, this case falls within the category of being "the clearest of cases" where summary
judgment is appropriate. Id. at 333.
12

nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment require that the information that is not disclosed
be known to the non-disclosing party and that the information be material Appellants were
not, and are not, able to produce clear and convincing evidence that Woodside was aware of
the presence of any collapsible soils beneath Appellants' house at the time the foundation for
the house was laid.
The district court properly granted Woodside5s motion for summary judgment on
Appellants' claims for fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment because
Appellants failed "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [elements]
essential to [their claims], and on which [Appellants] will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (cited with approval in Schafir v.
Harrigan. 879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah App. 1994)). Because Appellants alleged that
Woodside engaged in fraudulent conduct, they must prove all of the elements of their claims
by clear and convincing evidence. See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.
21 P.3d 198,207-08 (Utah 2001): cf. Colorado v. Western Paving Const. Co., 833 F.2d 867,
879 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying clear and convincing standard to fraudulent non-disclosure
claim). The district court properly determined that Appellants failed to carry their burden.
The district court concluded that the following facts were undisputed: "(1) prior to
construction, Woodside was aware of the existence of collapsible soils on [Appellants'] lot
to a depth of two and one-half feet; (2) between six and eight feet of soil was removed during
the excavation for [Appellants'] house; (3) after inspecting the excavation, a soils engineer
indicated to Woodside that the underlying soils would support the [Appellants'] house; (4)
13

Woodside followed the recommendations of the soils engineer in laying the foundation of
[Appellants'] house; and (5) during construction and after the completion of [Appellants']
house, Woodside understood that all of the collapsible soils had been removed from
[Appellants'] lot." (R. at 900,905.) Noticeably absent from this list is any fact regarding the
Delta Report or the Church Site. Nor do Appellants argue that the district court erred in
finding that these facts were undisputed.
A.

In the Absence of Actual Knowledge of Collapsible Soils Below a Depth
of Two and One Half Feet, Woodside had No Duty to Communicate Such
Alleged Knowledge to Appellants,

Applying the foregoing facts to this Court's ruling in Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App
291,77 P.3d 339, the district court concluded that Woodside did not possess knowledge of
any other collapsible soils on Appellants' lot and therefore had not engaged in any fraudulent
activity. In Fennell v. Green, defendants developed a subdivision in Layton, Utah. Id. at Tf
2. They obtained a soils report for a particular lot as was required by the city. Id. at ^f 11.
The soils report did not reveal the existence of landslide conditions. IdL A home on the lot
experienced a landslide that damaged some landscaping. The homeowner subsequently filed
a lawsuit against the developers for fraudulent non-disclosure. The trial court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
On appeal, the court stated that in order to determine whether the defendants "acted
fraudulently, it must be determined if any non-disclosed information was known to them and
whether they had a legal duty to communicate the information to" the plaintiff. Id at ^ 10.
The uncontroverted facts showed that the defendants were not aware of a possible landslide
14

condition on the lot in question. IcL at ^ 11. Because the plaintiff could not establish that the
defendants had knowledge of landslide conditions, it necessarily meant that there was no duty
to disclose such information. Id at T^f 11-12.
That is precisely what happened in this case. Woodside obtained a soils report for the
area that encompassed Appellants' lot. That report, the SHB Report, revealed the presence
of collapsible soils at shallow depths, which were removed during construction of the house.
Woodside completed the mass excavation to a depth of six to eight feet for Appellants' house
and requested that Gordon, the soils engineer who provided the earlier soils report, inspect
the specific site where Appellants' house was to be built. Gordon provided a Field Report
for Appellants' lot that concluded that the underlying soils would support Appellants' house.
(R. at 403-404.) The specific report for the specific site where Appellants' house was built
thus informed Woodside that there were no collapsible soils beneath the house. Because
Woodside did not have any other knowledge about Appellants' lot that contradicted the Field
Report, there was no duty to communicate the existence or contents of the SHB Report3 or
the Delta Report4 to Appellants. The only report specifically conducted for Appellants' lot
concluded that the underlying soils were adequate. The only knowledge Woodside had about

3

It is undisputed that all of the collapsible soil disclosed in the SHB Report was removed from
Appellants' lot.
4

Woodside maintains that it did not possess the Delta Report at the time Appellants' house was
constructed. Regardless, even if the Court were to deem that Woodside possessed the Delta Report, the Delta
Report does not reveal the presence of collapsible soils on Appellants' lot. Contrary to Appellants' assertion
that the Delta Report reveals the presence of deep collapsible soils near Appellants' lot, the nearest test pit
from the Delta Report does not reveal collapsible soils below five feet. (R. at 429.) The mass excavation
went down to depths of six to eight feet. So, even if the Court assumes that Woodside had the Delta Report,
the findings of the Delta Report were still rendered immaterial by the Field Report.
15

Appellants' lot was that all potentially collapsible soils had been removed from beneath the
foundation of Appellants' house.
B.

The Delta Report and Soil Conditions on the Church Site did not Change
Woodside's Knowledge of the Soil Conditions on Appellants' Lot

Appellants' efforts to impute knowledge about deeper collapsible soils on Appellants'
lot to Woodside because of the Delta Report and soil conditions on the Church Site5 are
likewise unavailing. The conditions explained in the Delta Report do not cover Appellants'
lot and do not even disclose the existence of deep collapsible soils near Appellants' lot. (R.
at 429, 450, 721.) While Woodside may have been aware of some problems with some
homes on the Church Site, again, those problems do not address any conditions on
Appellants' lot and added nothing to Woodside's knowledge about Appellants' lot.
Woodside conscientiously requested that a soils engineer examine the mass excavation
because Woodside was aware that collapsible soils were present to a depth of 2/4 feet.
Woodside was told that the underlying soils would support Appellants' lot. That is the extent
of the information Woodside had concerning the soils on Appellants' lot at the time the house
was built and at the time Appellants first complained about cracking in 1996 and that is why
the district court granted summary judgment to Woodside.

5

Appellants argue that Woodside should have revealed information about the lot known as the
Seawright residence. The Seawright residence is located on the Church Site and does not adjoin Appellants'
lot. Instead, it is approximately four lots away from Appellants and located at the bottom of a swell while
Appellants' lot is located at the top of a hill Additionally, any information about the Seawright residence
came after the completion of the mass excavation for Appellants' house and revealed the existence of
collapsible soils to a depth of three feet. None of this information is material, or even related, to Appellants'
lot as more than three feet of soil was removed from Appellants' lot during the excavation.
16

Based on the SHB Report and Gordon's inspection of the excavation of Appellants'
Lot, Woodside knew that there were collapsible soils in the area, but that those soils extended
only to a depth of 2lA feet and those soils were removed during excavation for Appellants'
house. As far as Woodside and Gordon knew, there were no other collapsible soils below
Plaintiffs' house (R. at 400,403-404), and there is no evidence to show that Woodside knew
of collapsible soils beneath Appellants' house other than the collapsible soils that Woodside
removed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY WEIGH EVIDENCE.
The issue raised below in Woodside's summary judgment motion was whether

Appellants' could produce clear and convincing evidence that showed that Woodside had
actual knowledge of collapsible soils on Appellants' lot other than those soils removed by
Woodside during construction. The issue is not what knowledge could be implied to
Woodside from conditions on nearby parcels, especially in light of the fact that Woodside
had a site specific report for Appellants' lot. The district court evaluated the undisputed facts
concerning Appellants' lot.

Appellants could not raise an issue of fact concerning

Woodside's knowledge of their lot and therefore attempted to raise issues of fact about
alleged problems on nearby parcels. Nowhere in the district court's ruling does Judge Stott
state that the Field Report is more persuasive than the Delta Report or the SHB Report. The
Field Report and SHB Report are the only reports that cover Appellants' lot, and the
information contained in the Field Report superseded the information contained in the SHB
Report.
17

Furthermore, the Field Report did not conflict with information in the SHB Report or
the Delta Report. The SHB Report revealed collapsible soils to a depth of 2Vi feet. The
nearest test pit from the Delta Report revealed collapsible soils to a depth of 5 feet. The
Field Report evaluated an excavation that went down to depths of 6 to 8 feet. Therefore, any
collapsible soils discussed by the SHB or Delta Report were no longer present on Appellants'
lot. The district court did not give more credit to the Field Report; it simply looked at the
facts concerning Woodside's knowledge, which was based on the conclusions contained in
the Field Report.
CONCLUSION
Appellants cannot dispute the facts relied upon by the district court in determining that
summary judgment was appropriate. They failed below to produce evidence that shows by
a clear and convincing standard that Woodside had knowledge of collapsible soils on
Appellants' lot at a depth greater than 2Vi feet, and those same shortcomings are present in
their appeal. Because the undisputed facts show that Woodside believed it had removed all
collapsible soils from beneath Appellants' house, it did not engage in fraudulent nondisclosure or fraudulent concealment, and the district court properly granted Woodside's
motion for summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, Woodside respectfully requests
that the district court's award of summary judgment be AFFIRMED.
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DATED this _[

day of April, 2004.
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS

£1

Ronald <p. Russell
Timothy B. Smith
Attorneys for Appellee/Defendant

19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE
was sent via first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following on this 7 day of April, 2004:
Stephen Quesenberry
J. Bryan Quesenberry
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ

Jamestown Square
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604

20

